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A treaty 
banning nuclear 
weapons tests 
WORLD PUBLIC OPINION forced the U.S.S.R., the U.K., and the U.S. 
on October 3 1, 1958 to begin a moratorium on nuclear weapons tests 
and to start negotiations on a treaty to cease such tests permanently 
under a system of inspection. These discussions have continued in 
Geneva ever since, but they continued so long that President Eisenhower 
on December 30, 1959 gave notice that the U.S. moratorium would 
lapse. He announced that the U.S. would be free unilaterally to begin 
tests again, but would in fact not commence any without further notice. 
The negotiations have been delayed at times both by the U.S.S.R. 
and the U.S. They have ilso involved compromises on the part of all 
three participating nations. While important differences remain, a treaty 
initialed by all three governments could be concluded by persistent 
negotiations within several months. 
The advantages of a nuclear test ban 
A test ban would make universal disarmament more possible. There is 
no long-range security for the U.S. or any nation in the "balance of 
terror" system where each nuclear nation has the immediate capability 
of destroying the other. The feasible alternative is the elimination of 
these capabilities for annihilation as rapidly as agreements can be 
worked out and put into effect, while providing mechanisms for in- 
spection and control, and developing institutions maintaining peace, 
security, and justice. 
A nuclear test ban treaty would contribute vitally important ex- 
perience in the establishment and operation of inspection systems, 
preparing the way for further steps in disarmament. Should the test ban 
negotiations fail, the possibility of successful negotiations for disarma- 
ment would considerably lessen. 
A test ban would inhibit other countries from entering the nuclear 
arms race. If a test ban agreement were reached soon, pressure for other 
nations to adhere to it would be very great. It is estimated that at least 
a dozen nations, other than the U.S.S.R., the U.K. and the U.S., have 
the industrial and technical potential to build nuclear weapons. France 
is building atomic bombs and perhaps China and other nations are now 
doing so. The very existence of a test ban treaty, which most nations 
would sign immediately, would place strong pressure on all to halt 
tests and thus prevent the development of nuclear weapons. 
Without testing, no country could independently construct nuclear 
weapons of efficiency or reliability. If test ban negotiations fail, nuclear 
tests will probably be resumed by some of the nuclear powers. This 
will make it easier for other nations to begin their own tests. The 
resulting instability of an already precarious balance of terror is one 
of the most urgent reasons for completing the current negotiations for 
a treaty. 
A test ban would help deter the use of nuclear weapons in a limited 
war. It seems probable that no war between the nuclear powers could 
be kept restricted to conventional weapons for any length of time. The 
probability of restraint as to the use and size of nuclear weapons would 
lessen as one side or the other became more militarily desperate. How- 
ever, there may continue to be small wars in which the present nuclear 
powers are only indirectly involved and in which nuclear weapons are 
not used. In this event, a testing ban would in effect give implicit 
recognition that nuclear weapons are not "conventional," reinforcing 
the hope that they might not be used in a limited war. 
The leading American opponents of a test ban advocate the re- 
sumption of tests by the U.S. so that low-yield nuclear weapons for 
tactical use in limited wars can be perfected. Tactical weapons are 
probably now more sophisticated than these people are willing to admit, 
but if their thesis is valid, then a test ban would have the effect of lessen- 
ing the continued development and thus restricting the use of tactical 
nuclear weapons. 
A test ban would prevent the exposure of mankind to dangers of 
new radioactive fallout. The somatic and genetic effects of the nuclear 
tests made by the U.S., the U.S.S.R. and the U.K. from 1945 to 1958 
and by France in 1960 will continue to be felt by humanity for gen- 
erations. The world's people, through the official resolutions of the 
United Nations, are demanding-primarily for humanitarian reasons- 
that a test ban be speedily concluded. 
As the example of France shows, smaller nations might launch tests 
in the atmosphere if a treaty is not signed, even if the existing nuclear 
powers initially confined future testing to outer space or underground. 
There is thus no assurance that fallout hazards w ~ u l d  be eliminated in 
the absence of a treaty. 
A test ban would symbolize the possibility of greater cooperation 
between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. A lessening of international tensions 
would follow and the cold war could subside. While this may be only 
temporary, it could be the basis for further meaningful cooperative 
enterprises which would be to the self-interest of both America and 
Russia and which would also benefit the rest of the world. If negotiations 
fail, the resulting frustrations would heighten tensions which, in turn, 
could increase the risks of triggering a third world war through accident, 
miscalculation, or design. 
Problems of inspection 
From the beginning of the negotiations, the U.S. has insisted that any 
permanent cessation of tests be accompanied by a system of inspection 
and control. In order that the system be psychologically acceptable to 
the U.S. and contribute usefully as a step toward general disarmament, 
the purposes of an inspection system need to be clarified. In addition, 
an evaluation is needed of the charge that the Russians have been 
continuing tests clandestinely and that, in any case, they have not agreed 
to the principle of inspection. 
American opponents of a test ban have tried to infer that inspection 
for compliance is the objective. They have gone to great trouble to devise 
evasion schemes in order to show that this objective-100 percent 
inspection for total compliance--cannot be achieved. There is, however, 
a second kind of objective for inspection. This is inspection for deter- 
rence of evasion. In this view, only enough probability of detecting 
violations need be provided so that the chance of getting caught will 
outweigh the potential gains from successful evasion. 
The most valid basis for judging any disarmament inspection system 
is whether it meets the needs of national security. Inspection that pro- 
vides for deterrence of evasion appears at this point to correspond closely 
to America's security requirements. it is doubtful if U.S. security would 
be seriously impaired even by unrestricted Soviet testing, if the U.S. 
did none. But it is doubtful that the gains sought in a test ban agreement 
could be achieved with an inspection system which did not appear good 
enough to deter evasion: 
Evaluation of the probability of detection must take account of the 
possibilities-even in a totalitarian society--of information from in- 
formers and through other intelligence channels as wel1,as the formal 
inspection system. 
If the test ban treaty were clandestinely violated and the fact became 
known, the resultant publicity would constitute a major propagandistic 
setback for the country found cheating. Those leaders in political power 
would be severely damaged even among their own people. Such testing 
could signal the acceleration of the arms race and probably a renewal 
of testing by several nations. It could lead new countries to develop 
nuclear weapons. Mounting international tensions would result, and 
the probability of nuclear war would increase. 
If a test ban treaty were successfully violated, the gains to the 
cheating country would be dubious. Evasion is a possibility only 
with relatively small weapons, well below the megaton range of 
thermonuclear weapons. Testing of small tactical weapons by Russia, 
for example, might produce some reductions in the weight and cost 
of their existing weapons. The gains, however, would not be sufficient 
to offset America's present greater industrial capacity or affect the 
balance of nuclear power. 
The Russians would probably find it cheaper and easier to double 
their present missile systems, based on the results of nuclear weapons 
tests already made, than to double the effectiveness of their existing 
weapons through clandestine testing. On balance, their incentives for 
cheating are not sufficiently great to justify the risks. 
There have been charges that the Russians have conducted clandes- 
tine underground tests in the past 28 months. Those who have made 
these charges have been able to produce no evidence whatever, only 
the assumption that the Russians must be testing small weapons if the 
West is unable to determine that they are  not. The Russians are cer- 
tainly not testing large (megaton) weapons because there is no prospect 
of successful concealment even underground. The political risks to 
Russia of detection are probably too great for the military advantages 
which could be achieved. Russia cannot afford to be exposed to the 
world as cheating after she has worked for more than half a decade 
to creat the image of a nation demanding the cessation of tests. 
The Russians, maintaining a "closed" society, have resisted the 
concept of inspection. During the 25 months of negotiations in Geneva, 
however, they have gradually come to accept the principle. The U.S.S.R. 
understandably wants minimal inspection, while the U.S. as an "open" 
society understandably wants as much inspection inside Russia as it 
can negotiate. The two sides are not unreasonably apart and any com- 
promise will be a victory for the principle of inspection. It could be a 
forerunner for more formidable inspection in the general field of 
disarmament. 
There is a law of diminishing returns in the establishment of in- 
spection systems. Any degree of reliability desired can be technically 
achieved (short of 100% ), but the expense and intricacy of the system 
increases rapidly after a certain point is reached. The decision on how 
elaborate a system is required must be based on an evaluation of the 
lengths to which a violator would go in order to cheat. This is essen- 
tially a political, not a scientific judgment. The Russians and Americans 
have been at the opposite poles of this question while the British view 
has been much less conservative than the American. 
While the possibilities of conducting tests behind the sun or moon, 
or in gigantic excavations a mile underground, may be theoretically 
interesting, the expense, effort, and chances of exposure involved in 
these methods are too great, and the gains too small to require a costly 
and elaborate inspection system to deter their use. 
A Time Limit to Negotiations? 
Several Americans have suggested that Russia would prefer an 
unwritten moratorium on nuclear weapons testing rather than a treaty. 
They imply that the Russians have successfully stalled the negotiations 
for two years and are likely to continue to do so for as long as possible. 
These critics insist that the U.S. cannot forever be a party to an un- 
written moratorium and therefore the U.S. must suggest a deadline to 
Russia for theconclusion of a treaty, beyond which the U.S. will resume 
tests. 
These critics overlook the concessions to the American point of 
view which the U.S.S.R. has made. Among them might be noted the 
following : 
1. Agreement to accept the findings of the 1958 conference of 
scientists on how to detect tests as the basis for negotiating a 
treaty. The Russian view was that tests had been and could 
continue to be adequately monitored without penetration of the 
suspected country. 
2. Agreement to discuss the technical problems of detecting tests 
in outer space following revelation of the secret U.S. "Argus" 
series. A second agreed scientific report was secured. The Rus- 
sians agreed to the incorporation of the findings in the treaty. 
The U.S. stated that it would draft appropriate treaty language. 
To date it has not done so. 
3. Agreement to reconsider the basis for the detection of under- 
ground tests after stubborn resistance to the new U.S. findings. 
The results of this conference were not "agreed," but the Russians 
have agreed to enter into a joint research program to improve 
underground detection. 
4. Agreement to accept nationals of foreign countries as at least 
half of the staff at inspection posts in the Soviet Union. The 
U.S.S.R. originally insisted on a staff entirely of Russians. 
5. Agreement to allow roving inspections on a quota basis within 
the Soviet Union, not subject to veto. The actual number has 
yet to be negotiated. 
While the negotiations have been protracted, there is no evidence 
that a deadlock has been reached. The negotiations recessed early in 
December because of the obvious interregnum in American policy- 
making between the Eisenhower and the Kennedy Administrations. 
Unresolved Issues 
There are many issues, only one of which is inspection, which are 
at present separating Russia and the West at the bargaining table. None 
of the issues, including inspection, is beyond the possibility of com- 
promise acceptable to the West. The major unresolved issues remain 
negotiable. Some of these include: 
1. CONTROL BODY. The Soviet Union seeks "parity" on this 
seven-nation body. It would prefer to have three members from 
Eastern countries, three from the West, and one neutral. The 
U.S. and U.K. would prefer three Western nations, two Soviet 
bloc countries, and two neutrals. 
2. STAFFING OF CONTROL POSTS. The Russians have been 
brought along to the point at which they now have agreed to 
accept the Western position--calling for one-third Russian 
personnel, one-third U.S.-U.K. personnel, and one-third from 
other countries. However, the composition of the third "third" 
remains undecided. 
3. ON-SITE INSPECTIONS. Agreement has been reached on the 
principle of a yearly quota of roving inspections, not subject 
to veto. On the basis of a treaty initially covering the larger tests, 
the U.S. is asking for a quota of 20 such inspections on Soviet 
soil. The U.S.S.R. is offering three. 
4. MORATORIUM. The U.S. reluctantly agreed to a moratorium 
on small tests while a coordinated research program for im- 
proving detection techniques proceeds. The U.S.S.R. has sug- 
gested that the moratorium be four or five years in duration; 
the U.S. has offered 27 months. 
5 .  RESEARCH. The U.S.S.R. has agreed to the U.S. wishes re- 
garding use of nuclear devices to perfect a detection network, 
provided it be allowed to inspect the device to insure that it 
is not a concealed test. The present U.S. Atomic Energy Laws 
will not permit this, and the issued has not been resolved. 
As Senator Hubert Humphrey concluded in his Disarmament Sub- 
committee report, "The performance of the two sides thus far indicates 
that with continued efforts, augmented by a modest amount of reason- 
ableness, a test ban treaty that would not detract from the security of 
the participating nations could be concluded." 
At the moment it is enough for the U.S. to declare that it will not 
tolerate an endless moratorium without a treaty calling for inspection. 
In view of the progress already made and of the opportunity for success 
which clearly exists, it is still too early for the U.S. to set a deadline 
and declare that it will resume nuclear tests after a specific date unless 
the treaty is completed by then. 
The decision to break off negotiations and to begin nuclear tests 
again, even underground, would have far-reaching repercussions which 
could only be likened in importance to the original decision to drop 
the atomic bomb. 
Vigorous attempts are being made to divert public attention from 
the real issue, which is that it is possible to achieve a nuclear test ban 
treaty that could be a first step leading in time to the end of the arms 
race. These efforts to mislead the public should be actively opposed. 
A half-treaty or none? 
Some critics of a test ban have suggested that a treaty be concluded to 
outlaw only the testing of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere and of 
larger weapons underground (above the seismic magnitude of 4.75). 
A half-treaty of this sort would have severe psychological disadvantages 
and few political or military advantages. A comprehensive test ban 
has clarity of meaning and intent not achievable with partial measures. 
Tests below this threshold are sufficiently detectable so that such a 
course would not be justified, particularly in the light of the proposed 
US.-U.S.S.R. research program. 
Nth country participation 
If a nuclear test ban treaty were signed by the three powers now ne- 
gotiating in Geneva, the problem of inducing other nations to become 
signatories will arise. Most nations will be only too glad to sign. They 
have been urging the nuclear nations to sign a treaty for years. However, 
France may want to build up her nuclear arsenal before giving up 
testing. China may refuse to participate, or  may attach a price for 
participation, such as taking her seat in the U.N. If it is too late to 
invite additional powers to participate in the Geneva negotiations at 
this stage, such a step might have eased the way for France and China. 
But even they will be subject to strong pressure from the world com- 
munity as the great majority of nations sign such a treaty. The U.S. 
should be prepared for difficult bargaining to extend a treaty to these 
powers. 
Recommendations for action 
1. The Kennedy Administration should pursue the nuclear test 
ban negotiations with determination and utmost vigor. 
2. The goal should be an inspected cessation of all nuclear weapons 
tests, with a moratorium on tests in outer space and on small 
tests underground, one of sufficient duration so that scientists 
of the participating countries can improve the techniques of 
detection to bring all tests subsequently within the scope of 
the treaty. 
3. No date should be set at this time on concluding an agreement, 
although the U.S. could reiterate its declaration that it will not 
agree to an endless moratorium. 
4. France, China, and other nations which are potential nuclear 
powers should be particularly urged to be signatories of the 
treaty as soon as it is completed. The treaty should be universal. 
5. Concerned American organizations and individuals should begin 
now to make plans for sufficient public support of a nuclear test 
ban treaty to assure its ratification by the U.S. Senate. 
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Here Is What 
1. Write a letter to President Kennedy in your own words urging that 
the U.S. work vigorously for a treaty banning all nuclear weapons 
tests. 
Send this to: President John F. Kennedy 
The White House 
Washington, D. C. 
If you have time to write two additional letters with the same 
message, send them to the following: 
Secretary Dean Rusk 
Department of State 
Washington 25, D. C. 
Mr. John J. McCloy, Adviser, 
Disarmament Administration 
Washington 25, D. C. 
2. Write letters to both your senators (Senate Office Building, Wash- 
ington 25, D. C.) and to your congressman (House Office Building, 
Washington 25, D. C.) urging them to support the policies given in 
this booklet. Enclose a copy of this primer. 
1 3. Visit key leaders in your community (businessmen, educators, labor i officials, etc.), talk to them about this issue of nuclear weapons 1 tests, and give each a copy of this primer. 
4. Visit the appropriate editor or editorial writer of your local news- 
paper and talk to him about this issue and give him a copy of 
this primer. 
5. Discuss this issue with your minister, priest, or rabbi and urge him 
to deliver a sermon on the topic. 
6. Urge appropriate education and action projects on this issue cul- 
minating in the adoption of a resolution in the clubs, civic associa- 
tions, political parties, unions, veterans groups, and church or 
synagogue to which you belong. 
9. Order quantities of this primer (and companion primers on "Dh 
armament: What Kind? Haw Much?" and "The Econornirn of 
Disarmaznent") for distribution. There is a special quantity price of 
32 primers (all similar or four of each) for $l,W postpaid. I 
8. Keep in close touch with National SANE and other national peace 
organizations for further developments on this issue. 
The following persons have read this primer and have 
recommended that it be "carefully reviewed by President 
Kennedy and members of his Administration with responsi- 
bility in this area: 
CHRISTIAN B. ANFINSEN, Chief, Laboratory of Cellular Physiology, National 
Heart Institute, Maryland. 
CHARLES 0. CORYELL, Professor of Chemistry, Massachusetts lnstitute 
of Technology. 
WILLIAM C. DAVIDON, Physicist, Argonne National Laboratory, Illinois. 
SERGIO DE BENEDETTI, Professor of Physics, Carnegie lnstitute of Tech- 
nology, Pittsburgh. 
WILLIAM A. HIGINBOTHAM, Head of Instrumentation Division, Brook- 
haven National Laboratory, Long Island. 
DR. DAVID L HILL, Consulting Physicist, New York City. 
HERBERT JEHLE, Professor of Physics, George Washington University, 
Washington. 
M. STANLEY LIVINGSTON, Professor of Physics, Massachusetts lnstitute 
of Technology. 
SEYMOUR MELMAN, Associate Professor of Industrial & Management 
Engineering, Columbia University. 
EARL D. OSBORN, lnstitute for International Order, New York City. 
RICHARD B. ROBERTS, Carnegie Institution, Department of Terrestrial 
Magnetism, Washington. 
JACK SCHUBERT, Argonne National Laboratory, Illinois. 
WALTER SELOVE, Associate Professor of Physics, University of 
Pennsylvania. 
J. DAVID SINGER, Associate Research Political Scientist, University of 
Michigan. 
JAMES T. SHOTWELL, President Emeritus, Carnegie Endowment for Inter- 
national Peace, New York City. 
JAY OREAR, Associate Professor of Physics, Cornell University. 
LOWELL 6. WAYNE, Photochemist, Los Angeles Air Pollution Control Board. 
HUGH C. WOLFE, American lnstitute of Physics 
GEORGE J. YEVICK, Professor of Physics, Stevens lnstitute of Technology, 
New Jersey. 
To Keep Informed/SANE-USA 
To work effectively for world peace today, concerned citizens must 
be fortified with facts and figures. World peace has become a compli- p~i , : '~ l  
cated study, but in our democracy the people must make the decisions ' 
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and not abdicate responsibility to any small group of policy-makers. ' ' ' I  
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To keep informed about the dynamic complexities in the fields of >: -i 'i 
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I nuclear weapons tests, disarmament, and the economics of disarmament, . . 
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read the monthly publication, Sane-USA. You will keep up to date with !, 
special monthly columns about developments in Washington and at ; 
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. [ ,?  An annual subscription (for 12 issues) of Sane-USA costs $2.00. : ,  . 
A two-year subscription is $3.75, with 50Q extra per year for foreign 
postage. 
In Place of Folly 
Norman Cousins has written a handbook for the concerned citizen 
on nuclear war and what must be done if man is to survive. You will 
know why Mr. Cousins is considered one of the most prophetic voices 
on the world scene when you read among the eighteen chapters of 
In Place O f  Folly those entitled: Primer of Nuclear War, CBR and 
Man, The Fallacy of the Deterrent, What About Russia, Don't Resign 
from the Human Race, and Checklist of Enemies. 
In Place o f  Folly has been widely reviewed and praised. Published 
in January, 1961, it is available in the cloth bound Harper Brothers 
edition for $3.00, or in the special SANE paperback edition for $1.50. 
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